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Okot Nyormoi
August 31, 2006
For nearly 21 years, a resolution of the genocidal war in northern Uganda between rebels currently led by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda (GOU) has eluded all attempts including religious prayers, military operations, diplomacy, dialogues, a presidential bet and others. Therefore, the announcement of the start of a new peace initiative mediated by Dr. Riek Machar, the Vice President of the government of South Sudan in Juba on July 14, 2006 was greeted with much excitement and hope for peace. The excitement this time was not without foundation. First, the dialogue was being conducted in a foreign country. Second, it is being mediated by an experienced ex-guerrilla fighter and a senior member of a government, which qualify him as an independent mediator. Third, the LRA has undergone a qualitative transformation since it now has a team of political advisors on its negotiation delegation, thus broadening its view of the war beyond a mere military endeavor. Fourth, world opinion has overwhelmingly shifted in favor of a negotiated settlement in recognition of the futility of the military approach to end the horror that the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs called the world’s worst forgotten humanitarian tragedy and the former UN Under Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict called the worst place in the world for children to be.
In spite of some serious problems such as chronic mistrust between the LRA, the GOU and Civil Society, the discouraging effects of the warrants of arrest for the top five LRA leaders issued by the International Criminal Court, logistical problems, mistakes made by the mediator and the initial overall negativity of the GOU, there has been some tangible progress. First, some of the myths created by the GOU that the LRA and by extension, the Acholi people, are mindless, apolitical clueless killers have been exposed and discredited by the performance of the LRA delegation in Juba and the various confidence building visits to the LRA’s hideout in Garamba. Second, a bilateral cessation of hostility agreement was signed, effective from August 29. Third, the dialogue has not yet broken down.
While we are happy to count our blessings, there are many concerns, which if not handled wisely, will lead to another crushing disappointment if the effort fails once more. They are as follows:
- While we should strive to end this war as expeditiously as possible, I think that the process should not be rushed for the sake of speed.
- While we should recognize the importance of timelines, I believe that it is not wise to link the peace process to some arbitrarily set deadlines such as July 31 or September 12 set by President Museveni or that may be set by other stakeholders. Timelines which are carefully negotiated and agreed on by all the stakeholders are more meaningful than those which are arbitrarily set unilaterally.
- It now appears that President Museveni wants to get this peace agreement signed quickly so that he can get rid of this albatross around his neck before the Commonwealth's meeting next November. I am concerned that it is disrespectful and dishonoring of the victims of this genocidal war to be driven by anything but the concern for the memory of those who perished and those who are still suffering from the consequences of the war. It is such an insensitive and uncaring attitude that led to 21 years of war when the problem could have been nipped in the bud way back in 1986. I therefore urge that the peace dialogue should be driven by the right considerations in order to guarantee a successful negotiation of a sustainable long-term comprehensive peace agreement.
- It also appears that some stakeholders want to reduce the Juba talks to a mere negotiation of the terms of surrender, security and resettlement for the rebels. While those aspects of the dialogue are important, I believe that it is absolutely wrong to take such an approach because we believe that the real resolution of the conflict should be based on the transformation of conditions from one that favors the development of rebellion to one that favors peace. That means that the talks should deal fundamentally with the genocide question in Northern Uganda in all its aspects. These include issues that are pertinent to Acholi, Northern Uganda/Eastern Uganda and Uganda as a whole. Some of these are plans for expeditious disbandment of the internally displaced people’s (IDP’s) camps, resettlement and compensation of the 1.6 million inmates of the camps. Others are issues of marginalization, issues of post war rehabilitation and reconstruction management, how to sustain peace in the post conflict period, the land question, protection of all citizens and others. We should all be concerned that a hastily concluded peace agreement could just bypass the need to dialogue on these entire issues because the power that be may not be interested in dealing with such fundamental questions. It is also easy to satisfy the top LRA brass and in the process leave out the welfare of the entire 1.6 million people. Once a peace agreement is concluded, no matter how hastily it is done, the President will most likely act like the proverbial kite, whereby you cannot see what is on its back once it is airborne. The resolution of the fundamental questions must be a part of the peace dialogue. It cannot be put off until after the peace agreement is signed.
- I am also concerned about the claim that the Juba talks are a matter between the LRA and the GOU. Whether we like it or not, everyone will be fundamentally affected by the outcome and the implementation of the peace agreement. Thus, to guarantee its success, we are convinced that all major stakeholders (the LRA, GOU and civil society) must participate in negotiating the eventual comprehensive peace agreement.
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