Friends For Peace In Africa

Part II – Kony’s Likely Role in Stalling the Process

[Note: An analysis of Museveni’s possible role in stalling the peace
talks was discussed in Part I of this article.]

by Okot Nyormoi

August 18, 2006

With each passing day, the people of Northern and Eastern Uganda, and South Sudan have longed for peace after 21 years of war between rebels currently led by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda (GOU). Thus, when The Juba Peace Talks started on July 14, 2006, there was euphoria that at long last peace was coming.  After four weeks, the initial euphoria is wearing off.

The LRA grew out of the Lakwena Holy Spirit Movement of the mid 1980’s and Uganda People’s Defense Army (UPDA) and possibly others whose goal was to resist atrocities committed in Eastern and Northern Uganda by the National Resistance Army led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni. While the rights of the LRA/M to resist repression, including cultural terrorism were valid, its methods of resistance such as kidnapping children and using them as child soldiers and young girls as forced wives were resolutely condemned the world over.

Some of the atrocities such as killing, mutilation, looting and wanton destruction of property are, however, believed to have been committed by the GOU and blamed on the LRA as part of its anti-insurgency strategies. The worst consequence of the war came in 1996 when the GOU decided to incarcerate nearly 2 million people in internally displaced people’s camps where they live under the most degrading and dehumanizing conditions possible - abject poverty, insecurity and health conditions above the level of emergency out of control. Indeed, the camps have become death traps since as many as 1,000 people now die per week from preventable non-military causes.

Since the first part of this article was published, many things have happened that raise the question of whether the Juba peace talks are poised to collapse. Last week, the potential role of the GOU could play in the failure of the peace talks was analyzed. This time, the potential role of the LRA will be analyzed.

First, it appears that there is no political will to negotiate in good faith. This is because of the lack of trust between the LRA and the GOU, which has now become chronic. For example, the history of the mistrust of the Museveni regime dates back to 1985 when it failed to honor a peace agreement mediated by ex-President Moi of Kenya. Since then, there have been at least five peace negotiations (1988, 1994, 2000, 2003 and 2004) all of which collapsed because of the GOU’s failure to honor its words.

There are already signs that similar mistrust exists in the current situation. For example, the LRA has demanded that a ceasefire be declared to not only prevent further loss of lives, but also to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process. The LRA even took the unprecedented step of unilaterally declaring a ceasefire on Aug. 8, 2006.

Unfortunately, the GOU has refused to reciprocate the LRA ceasefire. It argues that the LRA will use a ceasefire to rearm, heal and reorganize itself. Instead, it prefers to sign a ceasefire after a successful negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement. Yet, negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement could take months if not years to accomplish. In the meantime, nearly 2 million people incarcerated in the IDPs camps will continue to suffer and die from the horrendous camp conditions.

The failure of the GOU to reciprocate has apparently led the LRA to walk out of the talks once last week. However, upon persuasion by the mediator, the delegation agreed to return to the talks. Unfortunately, the Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) has continued to attack the LRA, killing at least 13 of the rebels. It was even reported that UPDF killed the LRA’s third ranked commander on Aug. 12. Although the LRA has not indicated that it will break off the talks, it is unlikely that it will continue to absorb losses inflicted on its soldiers while the talks are going on.

The second factor related to the first that may wreck the talks from the LRA point of view is the arrogance of the Museveni regime towards the people of the North in general and the LRA in particular. For example, Museveni regards himself as far more superior intellectually and militarily than Northerners in general and the LRA in particular. Museveni seems to think that it is beneath his dignity to negotiate with the LRA. He therefore appears to be using the negotiation merely as a ploy to either buy time or as a bait to lure the rebels into a position where they will be forced to surrender or be killed. This has happened at each of the last two or three attempts to negotiate peace.

Intellectually, the Kampala regime also seems to believe that it can easily out maneuver the rebels without its political wing. That was why earlier on, it sought to drive a wedge between the military wing in the bush and the civil delegation at the peace talks. It used such an approach successfully before while negotiating with an earlier rebel group, the Uganda People’s Defense Army (UPDA) and the Uganda People’s Army (UPA), in the late 1980’s. It appears that the LRA did not bite the bait this time. Nevertheless, the continuous display of the arrogance of power may eventually lead the LRA to conclude that the GOU is not really negotiating in good faith.

Furthermore, the GOU has and continues to use bellicose, belligerent, taunting and generally non-conciliatory language during the negotiation. It is well known that such non-conciliatory tones are not conducive to building confidence in a peace process. It appeared that in the past, such taunting and baiting often led the LRA to respond with military attacks to show that it was not yet defeated. Unfortunately, such responses played right into the hands of Museveni, who used them for his propaganda against the rebels. It is almost certain that the regime is going to not only provoke the LRA into breaking its own unilaterally declared ceasefire, but also commit some atrocities and blame them on the rebels to show that they are not honoring their own ceasefire.

In addition to internal factors, there are several external factors that could force the LRA to pull out of the talks. First, the indictment of the top five LRA commanders by the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an obvious one. Although the victims of the war are willing to use traditional methods of reconciliation to heal the wounds of war, and Museveni also has promised to give the LRA full amnesty on condition that they surrender, the ICC insists on arresting and trying the LRA commanders.

The amnesty law in Uganda also does not include the top LRA commanders. Besides, the major powers such as USA and Britain, which could make a difference in the peace process, do not appear to support the Juba peace talks enthusiastically. They also do not appear to support Museveni’s promise to give total amnesty to the top leaders of the LRA. An attempt by Britain to engineer a resolution in the Security Council to disarm the LRA also adds to the confusion. Even the imminent appointment of Mozambique’s former President Chissano as a peace envoy to Uganda might not allay the fears of the LRA that the international community is really not interested in the peace process.

All the propaganda, threats, bluffing and ultimatums the GOU has been issuing apparently have proven insufficient to compel the LRA to surrender. It seems that for many years now, the GOU has resorted to using the talks to lure and kill or capture LRA commanders. However, even that has done little to eliminate the rebellion. Instead, it has made the LRA less trusting of the GOU.

Last, but not least, is the LRA suspicion of the mediator. Last week, the LRA suspected that the mediator was losing his neutrality. They threatened to withdraw from the talks and even switch venues unless the mediator maintained his neutrality.  As it turned out, the mediator blundered by articulating the demands of the GOU. After serious back tracking, the mediator managed to convince the LRA to continue with the talks.

While it is normal for negotiators to present their maximum demands at first, there seems to be an intractable lack of trust between the LRA and the GOU. Such lack of trust appears to lead to their inability to negotiate in good faith. Although, it is hoped that there will soon be a break though in the talks, unless there is a major change in will, it appears that the prevailing conditions are not conducive to the continuation of the talks. In spite of the unfavorable conditions, the LRA and the GOU negotiators must accept and execute their moral responsibilities to expeditiously bring this war to an end.

Dr. Okot Nyormoi can be reached at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .