Friends For Peace In Africa

It appears that Museveni does not feel compelled to negotiate in good faith; particularly in light of the fact that despite a little wrist slapping here and there, Museveni’s two strongest allies, the U.S. and Britain have not wavered much in their support. Museveni has posited himself as the force of ‘good’ and the LRA as the force of ‘evil’. In this simplistic construct, the lines for negotiation are drawn – the forces of good must triumph. Within Uganda, Museveni has propagated the notion that the LRA does not pose a serious threat to his regime. He is seemingly content in confining the war at a low level north of the Nile and in South Sudan. As well, there has been no demonstrable internal groundswell within the country demanding an end to the war. Typically, whenever pressure mounts against his regime, Museveni responds by turning up the public relations volume to weather the storm, as evidenced by the recent flurry of media coverage.

Museveni has demonstrated his lack of commitment to the negotiations by: flip-flopping on the ICC charge, offering amnesty to the rebels and then delivering ultimatums; his effort to undermine the Juba talks by leapfrogging both his own team and the LRA’s in an attempt to negotiate directly with Kony and in his campaign to discredit the LRA negotiating team in an effort to decouple the political wing from the military wing. The LRA on its part has also been playing the ‘yoyo’ game, thanks to Museveni’s unintended tutelage. Unfortunately, the LRA’s participation in the ‘yoyo’ game simply encourages the Museveni regime to continue doing what it has been doing for years. The consequence is that the 1.6 million people imprisoned in concentration-camp style conditions continue to suffer.

Museveni’s strongest foreign supporters have, in general, given lukewarm support for the talks. In contrast, the LRA is still firmly on the list of international terrorist organizations and the ICC arrest warrant for the top five LRA leaders is still in place. Both these factors, coupled with the lack of a ceasefire, hamper the top LRA leaders from moving freely, though it is debatable whether their presence at the talks is necessary. Museveni has not appeared at the talks nor announced his intention to attend.

When Museveni first came to power, he promised to teach the Acholi people a lesson they would never recover from. That lesson has been taught for the last 20 years, culminating in recent statistics that show that the internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps have become a veritable instrument of genocide. Unfortunately, during the last show and tell – the 2006 presidential elections – the people of northern and eastern Uganda voted overwhelmingly against Museveni. If the results of the last election are a measure of how well northerners have learnt Museveni’s lesson, one may conclude that Museveni’s job of teaching his lesson to northern and eastern Ugandans will continue with no end in sight.

Another factor to consider is that Museveni believes that he is the ‘king of the hill’ in the Great Lakes region. He has no interest in contributing to the coming to prominence of a ‘new kid on the block’ such as Dr. Riek Machar. Having helped the SPLA fight the Khartoum government, he believes the GOSS owes him and should regard him as its Godfather just as he expected of the DRC under the late Kabila and Rwanda under Kagame’s regime. It is for similar reasons that some suspect Museveni of being involved in the death of Dr. John Garang a year ago. If the peace talk succeeds, it will raise the profile of the GOSS, which in turn will destabilize Museveni’s position as the dominant power in the region. Such a prospect does not sit well with Museveni, especially since the GOSS has refused to collaborate with him to arrest or kill the LRA leadership, forcing him instead to negotiate with them. A failed talk resulting in a return to chaos in South Sudan may be a scenario that would work towards Museveni’s intention to punish the SPLA and the GOSS for their alleged ingratitude to him.

Finally, although Museveni is still playing his usual ‘yoyo’ game, the LRA has probably learnt its lessons and moved on to another level. While simplistic tricks such as driving a wedge between its ranks might have easily succeeded in the past, experience has probably taught the LRA not to trust what Museveni says at face value. As well, Museveni’s image as the clever trickster is wearing thin because of the many strategic and tactical blunders he has made over the years. Consequently, he will not successfully manipulate the peace talks as he had done in the past.

Given the above considerations, it may just be a matter of time before Museveni pulls out of the talks. Whereas in the past he deliberately scuttled the talks, this time he will likely pull out due to his inability to manipulate the process to suit his interests. In an effort to save face, he may use one or more of the following pretexts for withdrawing from the talks. Firstly, this could come about if there is no good will to negotiate from both sides; secondly, the ICC indictment may become a handy tool, since it effectively discourages the LRA’s top five leaders from surrendering, despite Museveni’s assurance of a full amnesty. Thirdly, based on past mistrusts, even if a ceasefire agreement is signed, the LRA leaders may not emerge due to fear that Museveni may use the agreement to lure them to their capture. Fourthly, he may conceivably accuse the GOSS of impartiality since they have refused to arrest the LRA, as mandated by the ICC.

Whether the peace negotiation fails because both sides fail to negotiate in good faith or because Museveni is at his old ‘yoyo’ game again, the real losers will be the people in the IDP camps in northern Uganda in particular, and have lasting effects in Uganda and South Sudan. The winner unfortunately will be Museveni, as his genocide project will continue unabated. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to expect more violence in the region. The pressure on both parties to negotiate in good faith must be kept up to prevent the single proverbial frog from spoiling the water once again.

Dr. Okot Nyormoi can be reached at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .