Okot Nyormoi
November 24, 2007
The Juba peace talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda (GOU) started on July 14, 2006 to end of one of Africa’s longest and most vicious wars, now in its 21st year. The long war has left 1.6 million citizens incarcerated in over 200 internally displaced people’s camps (IDPs) scattered all over northern and eastern Uganda, over 30,000 rebel abducted children and about the same number conscripted into the government army and its affiliate militias, and more than 300,000 people are estimated to have died. According to a UN agency and the Uganda Ministry of Health statistics, the horrendous conditions of the IDP camps at one time was killing people at the rate of 1,000 per week. In a typical fashion of the history of this war, the peace process has once again become comatose after the negotiators broke off in June allegedly to consult with the various stakeholders. However, in early October, the peace talk descended into a deeper coma by the allegation that the LRA Second in Command was executed and a number of LRA officers defected to the GOU.
At this point, the GOU has finished its consultation, which it initially rejected vehemently allegedly because the idea was proposed by the so-called peace spoilers living in the Diaspora. By the time this article is published, the LRA delegation would have concluded its consultation. Unfortunately, some of the delegation is threatening to abandon Kony in the bush if he does not sign the peace agreement when the peace talk resumes after the consultation. Naturally, stakeholders in the peace talk, particularly the victims of the war, are worried that the peace process might be terminated prematurely, thus crushing any hope for peace returning to the region soon.
Before we become confused and despair about the Juba peace talk by the constant barrage of GOU deceptive disinformation, it would be instructive to look at the peace talk as a process rather than an instantaneous event. As a process, the peace talk has a history which dates back to the Nairobi peace agreement signed on December 9th 1985 between Tito Okello-led military government and Museveni-led NRM/A. Contrary to Museveni’s propaganda about Acholis killing themselves, the big picture is that Museveni is orchestrating a situation in which Acholis end up killing each other because Museveni perceives them to be the biggest threat to his grip on power. On the one hand, there are Acholis in the LRA and on the other hand there are others in Museveni’s UPDF who are the ones sent to fight the LRA. Approaching the Juba peace talk from this perspective will allow us to understand and appreciate the dynamics of the peace process. It will also allow us to anticipate the outcome of the peace process at any moment. Furthermore, it will allow us to avoid placing unrealistic expectations on the Juba talk in terms of both the prospect of success and the time frame of when peace will be restored.
First, it must be understood that whoever has state power (the government) determines how the national cake is produced and by whom; how it is divided and by whom; and who gets what slice and who is punished for not towing the government line. It is around this question that wars are fought, either to acquire control of the government or to wrestle concessions from those who have the power or to prevent abuse of the state power. The debilitating brutal 21 year old war in northern and eastern Uganda and the peace negotiation are all part of the struggle for the control of state power.
Having shot its way to State Power in 1986, the NRM/A regime moved systematically to destroy any real or perceived organized force remaining from previous regimes of Amin, Obote and Okello that would pose a threat to its authority. In the process, it overplayed its hands by violating the human rights of innocent people in the North and East. Surprisingly, the NRM discovered that violent repression, which it euphemistically dubbed “the pacification of the north”, could not win it support among the people it was oppressing. The more it oppressed the people, the less support it got. Even as late as the 2006 election, the overwhelming majority of the people in the North and East rejected Museveni’s candidacy for the presidency.
The second point to remember is that having captured state power by force, the NRM/A regime had to rely on force to maintain its power. This is particularly important when one considers the probability that there is not a single family left in the whole country which has not been wronged by the NRM/A regime in its quest to capture and to maintain state power. It must be frightening, to say the least, for the leader of the NRM to live with the possibility of what such people would do if they were given the opportunity to bring to account all those who have wronged them. Included in the group of people whom the NRM/A is fearful of are, of course, the dreaded LRA.
This is indeed the context in which the faltering Juba peace talks should be looked at. That is, to succeed in its mission, the NRM regime has consistently relied on the strategy of dividing, isolating and destroying its enemies dating back to the early 1970’s in the days of the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) when members who disagreed with Museveni mysteriously disappeared without a trace. The strategy was continued into the 1980’s up to the present. Museveni always signed agreements only to use it to split and destroy the organizations involved. Examples include the 1981 unity deal signed with the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFU) led by the late Andrew Kayiira whom the regime is suspected of assassinating in 1997, the 1982 deal with the National Rescue Front (UNRF), the 1985 Nairobi peace agreement with the Tito Okello’s regime which Museveni later termed a peace joke. Other deceptive peace negotiations include those conducted with the Uganda Peoples Defense Army, (UPDA) in 1988 and twice during the Bigombe-mediated peace negotiation with the LRA. In the latter cases, each time the LRA delegation came to negotiate with the NRM/A regime, it was split in some fashion. Some members of the delegation surrendered while others were killed or captured. Kamdulu, Banya and Kolo are well known examples of such a strategy.
The faltering current peace talk can only best be understood in the context of how the NRM/A regime has been suppressing any notion of democracy in order to maintain its monopoly on state power. The regime has been following the four-pronged approach, which has been vigorously promoted by the International Crisis Group during the Bigombe negotiation. It includes amnesty, the so-called soft landing solution; military attacks, referred to as the hard landing solution, negotiation and the International Criminal Court-issued arrest warrants. While the strategy has succeeded in reducing the number of the LRA fighters, it has done little to address the underlying causes of the war in northern and eastern Uganda. While the approach works to sustain the NRM regime in power, it does very little to move the country towards peace or democracy.
In the current situation, the strategy is geared towards chipping away at the rebel group. For example, at the beginning, the Kampala regime tried to divide the LRA delegation in various ways. 1) It claimed that the LRA delegation consisted of fighters and non-fighters many of whom were alleged to come from the Diaspora where upon it demanded that the so-called non-fighters be dropped from the team of negotiators. This strategy eventually succeeded when the so-called radical wing was dropped prior to the Mombasa meeting in April this year. From that point on, the LRA delegation has been increasingly viewed by analysts as one which has been taken over by alleged NRM security operatives (Matsanga, Ayo, Ojul and Ayena), some of whom had stood for election as NRM candidates in the 2006 election. 3) It is further alleged that considerable money has been used to bribe individuals to promote the interests of the NRM regime. This is in fact being alleged by the GOU as the possible cause of Otti’s demise. Could it be that the GOU has inside information, having orchestrated the action in the first place? Even if it did not, it wastes no time claim so for its propaganda value. 4) Another aspect of undermining the LRA delegation is the fact that key consultants or advisors of the chief negotiator, Riek Machar, include Owiny Dollo and Oulanya, are NRM members, who were re-soundly rejected by the popular electorate in the north during recent elections.
Deceptive propaganda has been an effective tool in the hands of the GOU in implementing the divide and rule policy. Consistent barrages of disinformation designed by one of the most notorious public relation firms such as Hill and Knolton, have been endless, all of which have been intended to cast the equally repugnant NRM/A regime as the angel and the LRA as the terrible evil.
In the run up of the Commonwealth Conference in Kampala, whether the recently alleged execution of Vincent Otti and mass defection of LRA fighters are true, nothing could have been better to distract the attention of the international journalists coming to CHOGM conference in Kampala than to refresh the story of the LRA being the evil and Museveni being the angel, which has for a while been eclipsed by the year long reduction in the shooting war in Northern and Eastern Uganda. It was an effort carefully crafted to prevent journalists from covering the horrendous conditions in the North and East, recently exacerbated by floods and the fact that Museveni has violated all the Commonwealth's principles. In any case, instead of casting the story as a struggle of competing visions for the country as was alleged to be the case between the late Col. Mayombo and President Museveni, the NRM propaganda machinery wants to downgrade it by pushing the line that “Acholis are killing themselves” as exemplified once more by Kony executing Otti.
Regardless of the validity of the alleged execution and mass defection of LRA fighters, it is fair to consider what effect they will have on the Juba peace talks. Contrary to the architects of the LRA who are suddenly shedding copious crocodile tears for the demise of Otti, several effects can be considered. First, a split in the LRA would deal a setback on the peace process as it will take time for the winning side in the LRA to reorganize itself before it can confidently take on the challenging task of negotiation. However, the split will not necessarily lead to war. The reason is that both the LRA and the GOU do not want to be accused of opposing the peace negotiation, even if each might be working to undermine it. Nevertheless, the possibility of a resumption of war cannot be ruled out. Should it happen, the biggest loser, once again, will be the million or so people who are still incarcerated in the death trap camps.
Second, as far as the LRA organization is concerned, on the one hand, a split will weaken it somewhat because of the loss of several senior commanders, but on the other hand, it will strengthen it in the sense that Kony, supposed winner, would have eliminated those whom he has been reported to have accused of working “in the interest of the enemies of the LRA.”
Third, as far as the NRM/A government is concerned, the incident would have helped it chip away at the strength of the LRA. More significantly, if the alleged execution is true, then the GOU and the ICC would have only two of five LRA commanders under the ICC arrest warrants to worry about. Assuming that the GOU and the ICC have a hand in orchestrating what was to happen, all the top LRA commanders would have been killed in the struggle for the control of the organization. If it were to have happened according to such a script, the ICC warrants of arrest would have become a mute case. More importantly, the possibility of bringing to book all those who participated in the massive human rights violation in northern Uganda would be permanently buried.
Since both the LRA as well as the GOU have vowed to continue with the Juba peace talks, the pertinent question is what type of talk this will be. To address this question, the following considerations have to be taken into account. First, President Museveni has the full backing of the United States by right of allying himself in the US fight against international terrorism. Second, Britain via the Commonwealth has also thrown its support behind President Museveni by holding CHOGM in Kampala and subsequently making him the Chairman of the Commonwealth organization. Likewise, by their silence, the international community has also thrown its support behind Museveni. The blessing of the fascist dictatorship has only helped mid-wife the Juba peace talk into its current comatose state. The consequence is that President Museveni, like President Musharaf of Pakistan, will become even more arrogant, intransigent and therefore refuse to resolve the underlying problems of fascist dictatorship that is all pervasive in the Uganda polity. That means that the people in the IDPs camps may end up being incarcerated there indefinitely and the problem of marginalization will continue until there is no more resistance of President Museveni’s dictatorial rule.
In spite of Museveni’s apparent overwhelming support from some of the most powerful countries of the world and his anticipated intransigency, all the peace loving people of the world need not be distracted or deterred by it. We must stay focused and determined to advocate for the truth and peace. First, it must be categorically made clear that it is utterly hypocritical and wrong for the USA and the Commonwealth to claim to spread democracy and development while supporting an outright despotic leader like Museveni. Just as previous attempts to whitewash Museveni’s true dictatorial regime during the Clinton Administration by promoting him as an African leader of the new breed failed, the current attempt to promote him as the champion of democracy and development will also fail. For a starter, his regime has already been found guilty of invading, plundering and fomenting ethnic cleansing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where as many as 5 million people perished.
Whether the LRA self-destructs or is split and destroyed by Museveni should not divert us from holding responsible all those who have created the genocidal conditions in northern and eastern Uganda. We must also not be distracted from working towards removing the genocidal conditions that currently exist in Northern and Eastern Uganda. This has to be done as expeditiously as possible by exposing the rampant hypocrisy existing among countries such as the US, Britain and Canada, which profess to be democratic countries and yet they pretend not to know that Museveni is a fascist dictator. After all, the LRA is only one group of people who oppose Museveni’s despotic rule. There are so many other groups including political parties, environmentalists, land owners, internally displaced people etc, who are strongly repulsed by Museveni’s despotic rule. In the particular case of northern and eastern Uganda, it is still just and right to call for and insist on a negotiated peaceful settlement of the war with or without the LRA. Therefore, Museveni must not delude himself into thinking that by defeating the LRA, the problem facing the country on his watch will be solved. The people who are still incarcerated in the IDPs camps must be freed and be systematically assisted in rebuilding their lives. Anything short of that is unacceptable.
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