Okot Nyormoi
February 15, 2007
The Juba peace talks between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda (GOU) which started on July 14, 2006 is now generally thought to be comatose or even dead. The peace talks was to negotiate a peaceful end of one of Africa’s longest and most vicious wars, now in its 21st year and has left 1.6 million citizens incarcerated in over 200 internally displaced people’s camps (IDPs) scattered all over northern and eastern Uganda, over 30,000 rebel-abducted children and about the same number conscripted into the government army and its affiliate militias, and more than 300,000 people dead.
The demise of the Juba peace talks was first signaled with the surprise visit of President Museveni to Juba last year, ostensibly to boost the talks, but who instead held marathon meetings with Southern Sudanese government officials and took a five-minute break to admonish the LRA delegation. This was then followed by the LRA negotiation team’s who left supposedly to take a break and visit with their families. Later on they all left Juba for the Christmas and New Year's holidays; while out of Juba they announced their intention of not returning to Juba (LRA demands Machar removal, By GRACE MATSIKO The Monitor, January 17, 2007). In a series of statements, the LRA delegates explained why they would not return to Juba and would not continue the negotiation under the mediation of Dr. Riek Machar. They accused both the host, the government of South Sudan (GOSS) and the mediator of being bias against the LRA. Consequently they demanded that the venue as well as the mediator be changed.
The mediator and the GOU reacted swiftly, dismissing the LRA demand as not serious and totally unreasonable. They all insisted that the talks were still on and that they expected the LRA delegation to return to Juba for a resumption of talks; failure to do so, they would be compelled to use the International Criminal Court (ICC) stick. Then both Salva Kiir and Machar dropped a bomb shell when they openly threatened to use military force to throw out the LRA from South Sudan. This was followed by Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir’s open declaration in Juba of the LRA as persona non grata on Sudan soil. The Southern Sudan President, Salva Kiir, went a step further and threatened mass action against the LRA (Salva Kiir wants mass action on Kony. By GRACE MATSIKO & Paul Harera, The Monitor, January 24, 2007). In return the LRA second in command , Genral Vinncent Otii, threatened to return to war if attacked (LRA gets ready for war. By PAUL HARERA SEBIKALI & RODNEY MUHUMUZA, The Monitor, February 6, 2007).
Since then, the LRA has stuck to its demands. Meanwhile, there has been a conglomeration of individuals, donor countries including the European Union, religious leaders and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and traditional leaders frantically urging the LRA delegation to return to the peace talks or else face the worst of military force to wipe them out and the ICC indictment. Some of them are gleefully predicting the end of the LRA (The LRA should know it has very few admirers. By Opio Oloya, The New Vision, Tuesday, 6th February, 2007). Meantime, the Juba talks have not resumed and the fast approaching end of the cessation of hostilities agreement on February 28 is increasingly becoming a major security concerns.
The motive and conduct of the many individual actors and organizations that have been quick to insist that the LRA delegates resume business as usual needs to be critically reflected on to determine whether it is good for sustainable peace in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan or not; and if it is good or bad, then for whom and why? There is an increasing consensus amongst many serious observers and conflict resolution experts that everybody needs to pause, and carefully and objectively reflect on the question of whether the peace talks should be resumed or not. To address this question productively, perhaps everyone needs to step back and carefully examine 1) the history of previous peace initiatives to establish the pattern of failures, 2) various competing interests, and 3) what impact and how they are influencing the course of the current peace process and in whose favor. Otherwise, it may be counter productive to simply resume the Juba peace talks.
Before embarking on the arduous task of critically reflecting on the problematic, it is important to acknowledge and deeply appreciate the modest measure of success that the peace talks have brought in halting the excessive violence in the 21-year old war, following the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) on August 26, 2006. This modest success has clearly demonstrated that a negotiated peaceful settlement to one of Africa’s longest, bloodiest and most ignored war is possible in spite of the many difficulties. Every effort must, therefore, be made to arrest the downward spiraling of the peace process, based on the need to attain sustainable peace and not simply ending of violence.
1. We are concerned about several statements made by some of the major stakeholders (Presidents Museveni, Bashir and Kiir) threatening to take military action against the LRA (Kiir says he is ready to force out the LRA from South Sudan, China View, Aug. 25, 2005”), while the LRA’s second in command (Major General Vincent Otti) has returned the favor by threatening to resume war if attacked. Such pronouncements perilously threaten the current CHA. In this regard, we would like to appeal to all peace loving people of the world to join hands in urging all the stakeholders to refrain from making provocative statements which are tantamount to a resumption of hostilities, thus violating the CHA. Even if the provocative statements were to be backed up by military operations, we are afraid that it will simply lead to nothing more than a continuation of the long sufferings of the people of the region - unarmed civilians will bear the brunt of the war. The situation will even worsen if unarmed or poorly armed untrained civilians were to be pitted against the veteran LRA fighters, who if anything have little or nothing to lose. We should learn from the disastrous experience of Northern Uganda where civilians were “mobilized” to arm themselves with bows and arrows to confront the LRA in the early 90’s by the GOU officials and the military. Sadly, once the human carnage started, those who “mobilized” the civilians for this wacky military strategy were nowhere to protect them from the LRA counter attacks. Clearly, we do not want a repeat of such a tragic situation.
2. Although we are not privy to the evidence of the accusation and counter accusations between the LRA delegation, the GOU delegation and the mediator, instead of dismissing the concerns of the LRA out right and rushing judgment against the LRA (LRA quit Juba talks, government rejects rebels’ demands, Grace Matsiko, The monitor, February 21), it is important for all stakeholders to do a thorough and honest assessment of the peace process, including self-reflection on what really happened that led to the breakdown of the peace process. The LRA delegation has given its view in a detailed report of what happened (Martin Ojul, Leader of the LRA/M Delegation at Uganda Peace Talks, February 5th, 2007, Why LRA fears to return to Juba, The Monitor 02.09.07). There is need to hear from the other parties too and then dialogue overall on the concerns of all sides. This will allow us to identify problem areas which should be resolved or avoided when and if the peace talks resume.
Although there is a notion amongst some actors and stakeholders that equates efforts to seek the truth in the peace process for the purpose of accountability with cursing darkness instead of lighting a candle, this notion should not degrade the need for such an exercise, which is a necessary condition to prevent “lighting a candle in a room smelling of gasoline or wasting effort trying to light a lamp that has no fuel”. In any case, the outcome of such an objective assessment might lead to a different perspective and a redefinition of the fundamental problem underlying the conflict and war. Otherwise, any attempt to simply call for a resumption of the Juba talks in a business as usual manner will most likely lead to another inevitable failure.
We conclude this part by asking whether the inevitable failure of the Juba peace talks can be avoided? Here, we want to draw a distinction between the Juba peace talks and the peace process itself. The former is a specific initiative and the latter is the process which goes on even when a specific peace initiative has failed. The focus here is on the Juba peace talks as a specific initiative. The answer is a resounding yes that the Juba-like failure can be avoided. How this can be avoided will be discussed in Part II of the article.
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To revive or not to revive the Juba Peace talks
Part II
Okot Nyormoi
February 15, 2007
In Part I of this article, we concluded that failure of the Juba like peace talks can be avoided. One way by which this can be avoided is to critically examine why the peace talks have not succeeded and may not succeed soon if all our efforts are simply directed at asking the LRA delegation to return to Juba as business as usual. Instead, we should be examining the context in which all the peace initiatives have failed so far.
First and foremost, one of the major contributing factors is the deliberate or inadvertent failure by the stakeholders and major actors to recognize the common error about rebellion, even though some of them have had first hand experience with rebellion as rebels themselves or anti-rebel fighters. This error is based on the assumption that rebels are always wrong when in fact such a notion is often created primarily by the government to serve its own interests. Once such an error is made, then the next assumption is that to end the war or conflict, rebels must surrender (Kony, Otti must surrender by December. By Yoweri K. Museveni, The Monitor Nov 14, 2003), admit their guilt and then they can be given amnesty. Otherwise, they must be defeated in one way or the other. In the case of the LRA, the GOU has for two decades now created and promoted, and the world has accepted the idea that the problem in Northern Uganda is the Acholi people led by the LRA. Therefore, to the solve problem, the world needs to eliminate the LRA by all means possible or at worst make the Acholi solve their problem themselves. Logically, this has led to the Museveni NRM regime to orchestrate and preside over genocide (A case for genocide in Northern Uganda, FPA document submitted to the Canadian Government on January 5, 2005; Obote’s Notes on Concealment of Genocide (http://upcparty.net/obote/genocide.htm); Olara Otunnu, Unders Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflicts and peace prize acceptance speeches of 2005 and 2006, said that there is genocide in northern Uganda; similarly, renown Ugandan journalist Frank Nyakairu in the local daily, The Monitor (September 19, 2005), also called it Genocide; Women rights activist Ann Mugisha, also in the same local daily The Monitor (September 27, 2006), opened the eyes of her fellow women and the world to the ongoing Genocide in northern Uganda). Any attempt to understand all the failed past peace initiatives, therefore, must consider genocide as the context in which the failures have occurred.
Otherwise, we will simply be beating around the bush as a diversion.
To acknowledge the existence of this dynamic does not amount to putting the LRA at the same level as the ANC of South Africa, FRELIMO of Mozambique and all anti-colonial rebellions. It also does not absolve the LRA of its responsibility in abducting children, killing innocent people in the process and looting people’s property, all of which relate to the method of their war. It does not address the issue of the conditions that gave rise to the various rebellions within the last 20 years. We are very sure that without considering the LRA factor, there is plenty of reasons why the war in the north started and has defied all efforts to end it.
A cursory examination of the various attempted peace processes in Uganda shows that there is a consistent pattern of failure of all the initiatives dating back to the trashing of the 1985 Nairobi Peace Agreement by Museveni after he had signed it. This is due to the failure to acknowledge the root causes of the conflict in Uganda and the personality of the leadership. President Museveni, for example, has many times openly proclaimed that he does not believe in negotiations (I was forced into talks – Museveni, Hudson Apunyo, The Monitor, April 20, 2005). Many critical observers and conflict experts are of the view that, the LRA is nothing but a symptom of what is fundamentally wrong with the system of governance in Uganda. Clearly, one can see that even in Kampala where there is no war, the government has become blatantly dictatorial and fascist in the way it handles national issues. This frequently manifests itself in its shabby treatment of the opposition and any dissenting views. To compound the problem, hyper-corruption has been deliberately allowed to permeate the polity to cement allegiance - climaxed with the bribing of legislators to amend the constitution to remove the presidential term limit, thus ensuring eternity of the Museveni presidency. Armed with the power of a life president and supported by the USA and Britain, the President is emboldened to act with impunity. If the government can violate the political, civil and human rights of its citizens with impunity in the war free zones like Kampala, Jinja and Masaka before the full glare of both local and international media, what kind of treatment can one expert of the citizens in completely disorganized and press censored areas of the country or the rebels, whom he considers one and the same thing?
The second error stems from the first, that is, the unending attempts to pin the responsibility of war solely on rebels by the government while attempting to absolve itself of its responsibility in the crimes against humanity. In this particular case, the GOU has perfected blaming the victims to an art form. It blamed the Acholi people for supporting the rebellion (Sowing the Mustard Seed, Yoweri K. Museveni, 1998; more recently in Tracing the roots of the Acholi people’s suffering, Yoweri K. Museveni, The Monitor, June 28, 2005). This blame game has continued even at a time when there is no such support. President Museveni and his lieutenants have continued to blame the war on the victims by accusing the Acholis of killing themselves, when in fact UPDF deliberately assigns Acholi soldiers to fight the LRA.
The GOU also conscripts Acholi youths into militias, poorly trains them, arms and deploys them to fight the LRA, thus allowing the national army to watch from the safety of their barracks in the urban centers where they conspicuously indulge in business. As if blaming the Acholi was not enough, they have crossed boundaries blaming neighboring countries including the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan for supporting the rebels. The United Nations and the international community have also not been spared. They have been blamed for not apprehending the rebels (Museveni hits back at donors over aid, By Emma Mutaizibwa & Grace Matsiko, The Monitor, May 19, 2005). Additionally, President Museveni has found his past time indulgence in blaming Acholis in the Diaspora and journalists. He has called them all sorts of names - peace spoilers, idiots, criminals, etc. – their crime being describing the horrendous conditions in the camps. Sadly enough, Museveni’s western backers and donors have for the last 20 years conveniently bought into this Museveni game. Consequently, in this donor funded patrimonial state, Museveni has now expediently converted Uganda into a police state in which one cannot take pictures without the permission of big brother.
Given this trend, it is about time that Museveni should be held accountable for his actions, but nobody seems to be bothered! Not even his donor allies who outside Kampala pride themselves of being the architects, defenders and propagators of fundamental freedoms and rights. This is against the background that Uganda under the command of President Museveni was found guilty by the International Court of Justice for fomenting ethnic cleansing, looting and plundering the DRC of her natural resources during the 1998-2003 rebellion which claimed the lives of about four million people (Uganda is in talks with the Congo over $10 billion fine. By Frank Nyakairhu, The Monitor, January 2, 2005). Museveni and his generals are also alleged to be responsible for shooting down a plane in 1994 killing both Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda, thus precipitating the Rwanda and DRC genocides. Museveni and his military commanders including Otafiire, Kazini, Salim Saleh and others have been left to walk the corridors of power as if it is business as usual. Ironically, Museveni is at the forefront in pointing a finger at the LRA for committing crimes against humanity and not admitting his own responsibilities in fomenting at least three genocides in the Great Lakes Region.
Perhaps during this time that everyone is looking for ways to reactivate the peace process that we need to focus attention on the Museveni factor and his finger pointing at somebody else to see what role he has been playing in the many failed efforts to end the war. The onus is now on the donors and propagators of the peace process to step back and free themselves from the Museveni patrimony mentality in order to holistically attain a balanced view of the problem.
The third error stems from the international community’s omission or commission in which they have allowed Museveni to propagate the notion that Uganda’s national sovereignty is more important than protecting the lives of its vulnerable citizens. For example, Museveni refused to declare the North a disaster area in order to allow humanitarian assistance to be mobilized and delivered more effectively (Northern Uganda is a disaster area. IRIN, November 7, 2005; EA MPs back disaster calls. By Gerald Walulya & Emma Mutaizibwa, The Monitor, March 15, 2004). Museveni and his supporters in Parliament argued that the disaster in Northern Uganda had not yet reached a high enough level to declare it a disaster area, contrary to the proclamations of Jan Egland, the former UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs who called it “the world’s worst forgotten humanitarian crisis”, and Olara Otunnu, the ex-UN Under Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflicts, who called northern Uganda “the worst place for children to be in”. Even with the loud voices of the world’s senior diplomats and public servants, the donors have quietly looked on, despite doubling their relief activity budgets. Museveni also refused military assistance from both Kenya and Tanzania on the ground that UPDF was in control of the security situation at the height of the LRA activities or from the UN (Museveni snubs UN hand in Kony war, By Frank Nyakairu, The Monitor, Feb 13, 2004). These cases in point suggested a deliberate decision to let the people of northern Uganda suffer in a manner consistent with Museveni promise to teach the Acholi people a lesson they will never recover from.
The fourth error was the euphoric assumption and acceptance of the view that GOSS and the mediator were independent and therefore well suited to host and mediate the negotiation. As it has now turned out, this was a grave mistaken assumption. First, it is a fact that the SPLA fought the Khartoum government with the help of the UPDF while the LRA fought on the side of the Khartoum government. The close ties between SPLA and Uganda was shown by the fact that Mrs. Garang actively campaigned for President Museveni during the 2006 presidential election. Recently, the SPLA publicly acknowledged its close ties with the GOU. Furthermore, on the one hand, GOSS is asking the LRA to leave its territory, on the other hand, it is allowing UPDF to remain in South Sudan even after the agreement to do so had expired in April last year (2006). The President of GOSS as a member of the SPLA is also known to be a close friend of President Museveni. As a sovereign State, the Sudan, its component, GOSS, or its individual members such as Mrs. Garang and Dr. Machar, have the right to allow any foreign troops to be stationed within its borders or make friends with whoever they please. They also have the right to sign security pacts with any country as they have done with the GOU. However, by maintaining such relationships, they create obvious conflicts of interests which does and must disqualify them from hosting and mediating the conflict in which they have vested interests. Therefore, objectively the LRA delegation is right in accusing the mediator and GOSS of being bias in favor of the GOU.
The fifth factor contributing to the failure to evaluate the LRA rejection of the Juba venue and the mediator is the tendency of prejudging the LRA because of its past history of violence. While it is appropriate and necessary to hold the LRA accountable for its past atrocities, it is not correct to pre-judge them based on their history. In this case, the many allegations that they have leveled against the mediator and GOSS of being biased should not be dismissed just because they have committed ungodly atrocities, and blamed for whatever atrocities or acts of insecurity being perpetuated in Southern Sudan. Ugandans have enough experience and evidence of Museveni’s army’s military deception activities right from his days as FRONASA and NRA rebel leader to date. Given this background, it is only wise to systematically investigate the different incidences and then either accept or reject them on the basis of the evidence as assessed by an independent body.
The sixth, is the lack of effective representation of the major victims of the war who are not just those with mutilated bodies, but also all those who are displaced both as internal as well as external refugees, at the Juba peace talks. So far only individuals or representatives of individual organizations have been participating as consultants or observers. The problem with such manner of representation is that there is no accountability to the public. The individuals or organizations serve strictly at the pleasure of the mediator and the interest of whoever sent them. If anything, they have only helped to deliberately or otherwise spread confusion and thus ruining the peace process. In our opinion, before the peace talks are resumed, civil society/ survivors/victims should be allowed to participate in the peace talks, not as individual observers and consultants, but as a third team of negotiators along side the LRA and the GOU. We strongly feel that this is essential to ensure that the peace process is not reduced simply to the negotiation of the best terms to secure the security needs of the LRA and the best mechanism for the GOU to avoid being held accountable for failing to protect all its citizens while the interests of the victims/survivors of the war are left out. After all, for whom is the peace being sought, if not for the victims of the conflict?
The case for the victims representation as the third party to the negotiations in based on the fact that the violent conflict in Northern Uganda is unique compared to other civil strives on the continent. It has pitted the people of the region against one another to the convenience of the establishment (the children of one woman killing off one another). Furthermore, their participation will also help eliminate the problem of the mushrooming of individuals and interest groups who claim to represent civil society in Juba or in any other part of Southern Uganda.
The seventh problem concerns donors who are facilitating the Juba Peace talks. While we greatly appreciate their generosity, we are concerned that their demands for a resumption of the Juba peace talks is being driven by the fact that they have already invested so much money in the process, and not so much by the need for sustainable peace and development in the region. It is regrettable that their investment has not brought peace. However, throwing more money at a failed enterprise does not bring success without first addressing the basis of the failure.
Finally, the argument that changing the venue and mediator will waste time is like asking a farmer not to plant new trees after discovering that his old trees are of the non-fruit bearing variety. For 20 years, the Government of President Museveni with the financial, logistical and military training support of the donor countries and other interest groups failed to defeat the LRA. President Museveni and his allies have even failed to acknowledge the human tragedy (genocide) in northern and eastern Uganda. How do they now believe that they can defeat the LRA in peace talks in four weeks “without wasting time”? If they do, can they tell us why they have wasted 20 years and allowed the death of hundreds and thousands of innocent civilians and a total destruction of the region? This is impunity and the actors must be held accountable.
In conclusion, we recognize that negotiating peace is a very difficult task. Therefore, we urge all the stakeholders, particularly the mediator and the host country to be extremely patient to allow for any impasse which may develop to be resolved before moving on to the next step until sustainable peace is achieved. It is our unwavering belief, that peace is a process and not a one-stop event, and it cannot be simply grounded on the wishes of individuals or a single interest group, but a painstaking negotiation between the parties concerned. Based on experiences in Uganda, it is our contention that rushing the peace talks for the sake of rushing things as Museveni has been doing to solve the politico-socio-economic questions of northern Uganda in itself has greatly contributed to the protracted violent conflict and should not be allowed to stand in the way of seeking solutions to sustainable peace, reconciliation and the development of the region. Coupled to this is the unquestionable virtue of impartiality on the side of the mediator and those in his team or those whom he may co-opt as the need arises. Any acts of partiality could either scatter the peace process irreversibly like all those other previous processes which were attempted in Uganda for decades; or, even if a “comprehensive peace agreement” (CPA) is signed by the two protagonists, it is unlikely to guarantee sustainable peace and development in the region. Both the mediator and the host country, and as well as the UN envoy, the former President of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano, therefore, should look beyond the short-term benefits of cessation of military violence or personal friendship or returning favors, but they should focus efforts in attaining a holistic peace which is sustainable for the peoples of northern Uganda and South Sudan. Since the evidence adduced on balance, independent of the LRA’s allegation, shows that GOSS and Dr. Machar have a strong conflict of interests, we must conclude that it is not in the best interest of peace to continue the peace dialogue in Juba with Dr. Machar as the mediator. However, we fully support the continuation of the peace dialogue until durable peace is achieved.
Dr. Okot Nyormoi can be reached at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it .
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