What Happened to the Juba Peace Talks?
Okot NyormoiDecember 31, 2006
For nearly 21 years, a resolution of the genocidal war in northern Uganda between rebels currently led by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda (GOU) has eluded all attempts including religious prayers, military operations, diplomacy, dialogues, a presidential bet and others. Therefore, the announcement of the start of a new peace initiative mediated by Dr. Riek Machar, the Vice President of the government of South Sudan in Juba on July 14, 2006 was greeted with much excitement and hope for peace.
The excitement this time was not without foundation. First the dialogue was being conducted in a foreign country. Second, it is being mediated by an experienced ex-guerrilla fighter and a senior member of a government, which appeared to qualify him as an independent mediator. Third, the LRA appeared to have undergone a qualitative transformation since it had a team of political advisors on its negotiation delegation, thus broadening its view of the war beyond a mere military endeavor. Fourth, world opinion had overwhelmingly shifted in favor of a negotiated settlement in recognition of the futility of the military approach to end the horror that the UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs called the world’s worst forgotten humanitarian tragedy and the ex-UN Under Secretary General for Children in Armed Conflict called the worst place for children to be.
In spite of some serious problems such as chronic mistrust between the LRA, the GOU and Civil Society, the discouraging effect of the warrant of arrest for the top five LRA leaders issued by the International Criminal Court, logistical problems, mistakes made by the mediator and the initial overall negativity of the GOU, there has been some tangible progress. First, some of the myths created by the GOU that the LRA and by extension, the Acholi people, are mindless, apolitical, clueless killers have been exposed and discredited as a result of the performance of the LRA delegation in Juba and the various confidence building visits to the LRA’s hideout in Garamba. Second, a bilateral cessation of hostility agreement was signed, effective from August 29. This was renewed on Nov. 1 and again on Dec. 15, until February 14, 2007.
While delegates, the government of South Sudan (GOSS), the mediator, the LRA, the GOU and all the supporters of the peace talks should be commended for making the modest success of the Juba peace talks possible and encouraging, there have also been many concerns, which if not handled wisely, will lead to another crushing disappointment if the effort fails once more. As the year came to a close, it is appropriate to critically review the current status of Juba peace talks to see if the situation is still hopeful.
First of all, the negotiators, the GOSS, the supporters of the peace talks should be congratulated for the gallant efforts they made and for the modest but real success they have attained so far. While the peace negotiations have not succeeded in the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement as hoped for, they have not yet irrevocably broken down. Under the confidence building program, many people got to meet with the rebel chiefs in their bush hideout. Kony even managed to have his mother visit him after 20 years. Most importantly, the cessation of hostilities is still holding.
Secondly, just as it is important to acknowledge the positive accomplishments, it is also important to acknowledge some of the areas of concern. This will best be done against the background of some of the concerns expressed at the initial stages of the peace talks.
The first concern was about the speed of the negotiation process. It was noted that while the negotiators should strive to reach a comprehensive peace agreement as expeditiously as possible, it was pointed out that the process should not be rushed purely for the sake of speed. It has since become more disturbing because some people are trying to use speed as a convenient mechanism by which to avoid negotiating some of the issues which are important for attaining a sustainable peace. For example, the GOU and some observers at the peace talks have accused the LRA delegation of using diversionary issues whenever the LRA insists on a discussion of political issues which they consider important for the resolution of the war. So, the problem of rushing the talks as an excuse for not wanting to deal with substantive issues is still a matter of serious concern.
The second concern was about deadlines and ultimatum. It was noted that while it is important to set timelines for the negotiation, it was not considered wise to link the peace process to some arbitrarily set deadlines such as July 31 or September 12 set by President Museveni. Such arbitrary timelines usually reflect camouflaged interests which are anything but what they are publicly supposed to serve. It was also pointed out that timelines which are carefully negotiated and agreed on by all the stakeholders are more meaningful than those which are arbitrarily set unilaterally. Unfortunately, since this concern was expressed in late August, there have been many deadlines set by various groups. For example, as part of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement the Juba negotiators set up several deadlines for the LRA fighters to assemble at Owiny-Ki-Bul and Ri-Kwangba. None of the dates were met apparently because UPDF did not comply with the conditions of staying away from the designated LRA assembly places. The LRA also justified its failure to comply with one of the deadlines because it accused UPDF of killing its fighters. The GOU on its part accused the LRA for failing to meet the deadlines.
Meanwhile, various forces including the GOU, the mediator, Lawi Rwodi, and some other individuals did pressurize the LRA to sign a comprehensive peace agreement before Christmas in line with President Museveni’s demand. Kony’s mother was alleged to have also pitched in with her own deadline for her son to give up fighting within two weeks of her visit in the bush. Furthermore, the GOU arbitrarily set up a deadline for the IDPs to abandon the IDPs camps by the end of December 31.
Apparently all these deadlines were intended to be a tidy Christmas and end of the year present to be delivered to the people of the war-affected areas. Of course, these are wonderful sentiments. Unfortunately, the people of the affected areas need more than sentimental gestures. They need real peace, which can only be brought about by painfully pursuing the peace process without resorting to gimmicks, shortcuts or deceptions. Otherwise, any other approach will simply lead to a delay in the peace process and most likely an eventual disappointment at the end. For example, the people in the camps in most places in Acholiland and in some places in Teso are reluctant to return to their land because they are not confident in the ability or desire of the GOU to protect them should the war break out again.
The third area of concern was about the motives which are driving the peace negotiation. About six months ago, it appeared that President Museveni wanted to get this peace agreement signed quickly so that he could get rid of this albatross around his neck before the Commonwealth's meeting next November. Many conflict resolution commentators and human rights’ advocates were concerned that it was dreadful, disrespectful and dishonoring of the victims of this genocidal war for the negotiation to be driven by anything but the concerns for the memory of those who perished and those who are still suffering from the consequence of the war. It is such an insensitive and uncaring attitude on the part of President Museveni, his government and his international backers that have led to 21 years of war when the problem could have been nipped in the bud way back in 1986. Therefore, it was deemed necessary that the peace dialogue should be driven by the right consideration, attitude and human sensitivity, in order to guarantee a successful negotiation of a sustainable, long-term comprehensive peace agreement. This concern unfortunately has also not been addressed.
A fourth concern was about the content of the negotiation itself. About six months ago, it appeared that some stakeholders wanted to reduce the Juba talks to a mere negotiation of the terms of surrender, security and resettlement for the rebel leaders, the so-called “Confidence building” and “facilitation” activities. While those aspects of the dialogue are important, it is absolutely wrong to take such an approach because the real resolution of the conflict should be based on the transformation of conditions from one that favors the development of rebellion to one that favors peace. That means that the talks should deal fundamentally with the genocide question in Northern Uganda in all its aspects. These include issues that are pertinent to Acholi, Northern Uganda/Eastern Uganda and Uganda as a whole. Some of these are plans for the expeditious, planned, facilitated and orderly disbandment of the internally displaced people’s (IDP’s) camps, resettlement and compensation of the 1.6 million inmates of the camps. Others are issues of marginalization, post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction management, how to sustain peace in the post conflict period, the land question, human rights and protection of all citizens, local and national reconciliation and integration, and others.
A hastily concluded peace agreement could just bypass the need to dialogue on these entire issues because the GOU and its supporters appear not to be interested in dealing with such fundamental questions. Instead, they seem to do the more politically expedient thing. That is, it is easy to satisfy the top LRA commanders and in the process leave out the welfare of the thousands of abducted children turned LRA fighters, including the very people it deliberately deported into the IDP camps. In pursuit of such a sinister objective, they even want a so-called comprehensive peace agreement to be signed before the last four of five agenda items are discussed, contrary to any standard, logical, ethical conduct of peace dialogues, negotiations and agreements. Instead, they argue that their version of a comprehensive peace agreement is to be signed now while the important issues will be discussed later. Given Museveni’s track record, who would trust such a deal? If Museveni could trash a completely negotiated signed agreement of 1985, who will believe that he will honor one which is not even discussed yet? It is like putting the cart before the horse.
Even more important, such an approach will bypass the entire 1.6 million people who have been incarcerated and dehumanized in the IDPs camps. The concern was that once a peace agreement is concluded, no matter how hastily it is done, the President will most likely act like the proverbial kite which becomes untouchable once it is airborne. The resolution of the fundamental questions must be a part of the peace dialogue which should lead to a comprehensive peace agreement, which once signed must then be ratified by the Uganda Parliament, because of some of its provisions will have constitutional implications. Without that, there cannot be a comprehensive peace agreement of any kind. This is particularly troubling that such stakeholders are pushing for the so-called comprehensive agreement when the public, on whose behalf the agreement is all about, has not even been informed about it, let alone allowed to participate in the process.
So, what really happened to the way to the Juba peace talks as the year came to an end? First, the LRA made a number of blunders from which they are trying to recover without much success. First, they agreed to assemble at Owiny-Ki-Bul and Ri-Kwangba without first creating the necessary security arrangement for the safety of their troops. Consequently, to wriggle out of that one, they have to break the conditions of the agreement of the Cessation of Hostilities. There have also been public relation blunders. For example, Kony publicly denied that the LRA committed atrocities when in fact they are on record admitting having committed serious atrocities. In fact, it is on the basis of their willingness to own up to their responsibilities that they hope the victims/survivors of their crimes will forgive them, especially under the traditional system of “mato oput”. Furthermore, it was revealed that Museveni has been facilitating Kony and his relatives. As a result, Kony was probably duped by Museveni’s emissaries (Col. Ochora, Mao, Owiny Dollo and Oulanya) into proclaiming that Museveni is a good man. Of course, nobody in his or her right mind believes in such a proclamation. If anything, Kony might himself be playing Museveni’s game of deliberate disinformation. Otherwise, Kony has lost all the good will of the people and their willingness to forgive the LRA for the sake of peace. He will have to work very hard to regain the trust of the people.
Second, President Museveni has been looking for ways to scuttle the peace talks without making it seem so. While the delegates broke off for the Christmas recess, there are allegations that the GOU has been using money and promises of positions to bribe members of the LRA delegation and other individuals who are sent as observers to Juba with the expressed purpose of influencing the LRA delegates privately. The GOU has also been driving a wedge between the LRA top commanders and its Juba delegation by using a civil delegation of Col. Ochora, LCV Mao, Owing Dollo and Oulanya to negotiate with Kony directly and bypassing the Juba talks. They even ferried Kony’s mother and gave 10 head of cattle as Museveni’s gift to Kony to celebrate the 2006 Christmas. Given the fact that Kony allegedly does not eat food prepared by his own people without someone else tasting it, one wonders how he would accept cows sent to him by his arch enemy of 21 years. Whether the LRA feasted on Museveni’s gift is anybody’s guess, but it was clearly a publicity stunt to show that the President was sincere about the peace process to pre-empt any future criticism should the peace talks fail.
Third, another delegation of Col. Ochora, Mao and Bishop Odama is now trying to de-couple the LRA rank and file from the top leadership by camping at Owiny ki Bul and Ri-Kwangba. In fact this approach was developed by the USAID funded program implemented by the Northern Uganda Peace Initiatives (NUPI) whose mission is supposedly to win the minds and hearts of the Acholi people. In fact, the program appears to have failed miserably for failure to recognize the complex relationship that exists between the LRA, the people in the camps, Diaspora and the GOU. In any case, while the group may succeed in weaning the LRA rank and file away from their leaders, it may fail to restore peace because of failing to address the fundamental problem of marginalization of the north in general and Acholi in particular.
An assessment of the Juba peace talks will not be complete without examining how the mediator faired. Whereas, initially it was believed that the venue of the peace talks mediated by Dr. Machar constituted a superior environment than the one previously held in the bushes of Northern Uganda, it was believed that the venue and mediator were independent of the GOU. Dr. Machar was also viewed positively as a veteran of negotiation because of his involvement in the negotiation of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Unfortunately, the year ended up with a big disappointment with the mediator. First of all, the mediator has been consistently accused of bias in favor of the GOU. After a few weeks into the negotiation, he was already emotionally exasperated with the LRA. Towards the end, he was alleged to have been putting pressure on the LRA delegation to sign a comprehensive agreement before all the agenda items are discussed and disposed of. More importantly, he was accused of threatening to arrest and impose travel bands on the LRA delegation until they signed the so-called comprehensive peace agreement. In this regard, he is acting in the same way as Dr. Rugunda was alleged to have done in 2004 when Bigombe was the mediator in the bush. The consequence was the total collapse of the Bigombe II peace initiative. In so doing, the mediator has lost all credibility. Again, he will have to work very hard to reclaim any reputation of impartiality required for effective mediation.
By implication, GOSS has also lost credibility. More importantly, GOSS has publicly asserted the alliance between the Sudanese Liberation Army (SPLA) and Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF). Besides, in spite of the expiration in April 2006 of the agreement under which UPDF was allowed into South Sudan, GOSS has not so far insisted on asking the UPDF to comply with the Sudanese Parliamentary resolution asking it to withdraw from Sudan. If it did, it is even worse that UPDF has refused to comply with the request. It is also altogether likely that UPDF is staying because of the internal political dynamics of Sudan, and not yet left as demanded. In this regard, GOSS might need UPDF as a safety net to sustain its own otherwise fragile peace. The close relationship between GOSS and the UPDF undermines the objectivity needed by the mediator in these negotiations and enforces the instability in the region.
In conclusion, the Juba talks which started with great fanfare and hope finished the year limping badly. Somehow, the GOU has found a way to wrestle control of the process away from the LRA and the mediator. While the GOU may bask in its eventual success in once again scuttling the peace talks and may in fact corral the LRA, it merely continues to perpetuate the same conditions which breed rebellion.
Given what happened to the way to the Juba peace talks, how do we rescue the peace process from being used by the Museveni regime as an instrument of “teaching the Acholi people a lesson they will never recover from” according to the following quote, “"To transform a human being into an efficient, uncostly, and completely subservient slave, you have, as a pre-condition, to completely purge him of his humanity, manhood, and will. Otherwise, as long as he has some hope of a better, free future, he will never succumb to enslavement. To become an efficient instrument of oppression, you have to radically de-humanise yourself by forgoing many qualities that are normally found in balanced human beings. You purge yourself of compassion, altruism, consideration of other people's suffering and the capacity to restrain your greed....- " Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, (writing in his dissertation, Dar-es-Salaam University).
Similarly, the process must also not be used by the LRA primarily to save its skin?
In my view, the peace process can be rescued from total disintegration by doing most if not all of the following:
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At the very least, the 2007 challenge will be to create a new environment which is more conducive for the peace dialogue than it has been so far. There must be a serious self-reflection by the fighters to re-humanize themselves and to genuinely recommitment themselves to really solve the problem. This must be reflected in the language used, exhibition of appropriate sensitivity to the pain suffered by the victims/survivors of the war, and by stopping the public relations war from being the primary focus of the two warring factions.
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The peace talks must be controlled by a respectable, fair minded and independent mediator acceptable to all stakeholders, which is necessary for inspiring and sustaining confidence in the peace process by all stakeholders. This can only be verifiable if the peace process is made substantially transparent. Otherwise, any attempt by either the LRA or the GOU to make it its goal to control the process will simply poison it.
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All the major concerns expressed here must be substantially addressed, otherwise it is unlikely that a sustainable peace can be attained in the near future.
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A new provision must be instituted to allow a representation of the victims/survivors of the war not just as individual observers, but as an organized and equal participant in the peace process. To arrive at such an organized representation will require a process which must also be independent of the government. Otherwise, stocking the process with either LRA or government agents will only seek to control the process by one group or another.
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