Juba Peace Talks: The Confidence-Building Measures
That Shook LRA Confidence
By John A. Akec
Sunday, August 06, 2006
As many teachers and parents would tell you, not every school trip or mountain climbing exercise goes well. Some trips, despite good intentions and preparations, end up in tears. Such was the sorrowful fate of a confidence-building measure expedition organized by the governments of Uganda (GOU) and Southern Sudan (GOSS) (the current peace mediator) in which 15 relatives of LRA commanders, Acholi elders, Church leaders, peace activists, and journalists were transported to meet Joseph Kony near the border of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan.
According to news reports, on Wednesday, 3 August 2006, Kony met with Acholi leaders, many of whom had spent the night at Kony’s base. On Thursday, Kony and Vincent Otti met with chief mediator Dr. Riek Machar as well as personalities representing the GOU. Surprisingly, between Thursday night and Friday morning, the relationship between Dr. Machar and the LRA soured.
WHAT WENT WRONG?
According to media sources, on Wednesday,2 August, the LRA promised in principle that Otti would accompany Machar and the LRA delegation to Juba for the second round of peace talks after a two week break from the first session. On Thursday,3 August, the LRA leaders changed their minds and informed Dr. Machar that they did not feel safe enough for Otti to join the talks at this early stage when there was no ceasefire, and the ICC arrest warrant was still in place. Furthermore, the LRA turned down the request by Machar to reveal the locations of their bases in Southern Sudan and the DRC. It was at that point that Dr. Machar stormed out of the meeting and ordered his convoy to leave the LRA negotiating team stranded in the bush some 27 miles away from Kony’s base in the DRC.
On Friday, 4 August, the LRA expressed its concerns over its rapidly declining confidence in the mediation role of Dr. Machar and the GOSS and threatened to look for another venue for the negotiation if the eroding impartiality of the mediator did not stop.
The GOU, too, became a hindrance by contradicting Dr. Machar when it declared that it was ready to resume talks with or without Otti and then went into overdrive to undermine the confidence between the LRA and GOSS by claiming that the LRA had withdrawn from the talks. However, to show that they had not withdrawn from the talks, the LRA declared a unilateral ceasefire, which the GOU has yet to reciprocate insisting that they will agree to one only after a comprehensive peace agreement is signed.
Because of this ongoing mistrust, the LRA is said to have relocated its headquarters for fear of an attack by the Ugandan army, especially since its location is now well known to the GOU following recent confidence-building visits by various government functionaries. Although the GOU took advantage of this misfortune by declaring that the LRA had pulled out of the talks, the LRA quickly snuffed the claim by declaring a unilateral ceasefire and inviting the government to reciprocate.
DR. MACHAR, A MAN WITH MUCH TO PROVE
The Northern Ugandan Peace Initiative put the South Sudan Vice President, Dr Riek Machar, in the limelight. Pictures of his first meeting with Kony this May were flashed on TV screens around the world, attracting a lot of international interests For instance, after a meeting with President Museveni last week, the British High Commissioner to Uganda, Mr. Francois Gordon, told the press in Kampala that the international community is following the talks with “keen interest.” John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group stated recently in a workshop at the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington, DC that, “the effort of the government of South Sudan to mediate between the LRA and the GOU is noble.” Prendergast called for the US administration to appoint a peace envoy to Northern Uganda and to act as a guarantor for any agreement that the parties to conflict might reach in the future.
To appreciate what happened last week, it is worth looking into Dr. Machar’s biography. In 1991, he led an unsuccessful coup d’état against Dr. John Garang in 1991. The break away group was later renamed the South Sudan Independent Movement (SSIM), which later signed the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. Under Machar’s leadership, SSIM disintegrated in a spectacular failure, which enabled the Khartoum government to secure oil fields in the Upper Nile region. Since then, the military balance has swung in favour of the Khartoum government. In the end, in 2000, Dr Machar fled to Kenya with a handful of followers, leaving the bulk of his army under the control of the Khartoum government. Machar rejoined SPLM/A under Garang in 2001. To his credit, Dr. Machar played a dynamic role in healing the rift between Chairman Garang and his then Deputy, Salva Kiir in Rumbek in November 2004. Otherwise, his return did not mean much in terms of military gains for the SPLA, but it was a moral, symbolic and political victory for SPLM and South Sudanese as a whole, since he was the original leader of the rebellion.
Some unforgiving commentators tend to draw parallels between Machar’s return to SPLM in 2001, and the biblical “prodigal son” who left his rich and powerful family, only to return penniless and weak. The commentators also point out that as Chairman of SSIM, Dr. Machar was largely responsible for the disintegration of his own political group. He is said to be unpredictable and controversial at times, a quitter and lacking in foresight, which may continue to undermine his credibility in the future. To ensure that nothing goes wrong with the talks, the President of the GOSS has not taken full charge of the negotiation although Dr. Machar is still the actual mediator Time will tell if Dr. Machar can overcome the curse and the shadow of his past failures and pull off a miracle this time around.
THE LACK OF FOCUS AND PRIORITIES
The greatest weakness of the Southern Sudan-mediated talks between LRA and GOU is the lack of focus and absence of information about any progress or the lack thereof. In order to make progress, the Chief mediator should continue to insist on a ceasefire by both parties. Once the parties agree, they should declare their principles of negotiations. Then the GOSS should call for support from the UN, South Africa, Britain, the US and others. In particular, the GOSS should use its good office with the current US Administration to convince the Bush administration to appoint a peace envoy for Northern Uganda and to act as a guarantor of any agreement that may result from these efforts.
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The peace talks have been hampered by the outstanding ICC arrest warrants for the top five LRA commanders. A few weeks ago, Mr. Koffi Annan, the UN Secretary General said that the “ICC’s arrest warrants made LRA leaders less approachable.” Ms. Betty Bigombe told Christian Science Monitor that the ICC’s involvement has brought “complications.” The implication of such statements was played out this weekend when the trust between the LRA leaders and Riek Machar fell to rock bottom.
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
Since the war started in August of 1986 in Northern Uganda, about 2 million people in Northern and Eastern Uganda have been forced out of their homes by the Ugandan army to live under horrendous conditions in some 200 camps, largely recognized as death traps.
UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland described the Northern Uganda conflict as, “one of the worst forgotten conflicts in the world, and worse [in magnitude] than that of Darfur or Iraq.” Dr Rima Salah, UNICIEF Deputy Director, told the Congressional Human Rights Caucus on March 9, that, “The social issues that exist elsewhere in Uganda,— domestic violence, rape, and child abuse — among others‚ are exacerbated in the camps. The mortality and morbidity rates are described as emergencies spun out of control.”
In a briefing to the British Parliament in July, Mark Simmonds (MP, Boston and Skegness, UK) quoted a report by World Vision (Uganda) that 3,500 people die every month in Uganda's internally displaced persons camps. This mortality rate is believed to be 3 times higher than those recorded in Darfur in 2005.
High profile Ugandans such as Dr. Olara Otunnu have described the policy of forceful relocation of Acholi population to these camps as “genocide.” Otunnu, a former UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, painted grim a picture of abject destitution in these camps in an article published in Foreign Policy magazine (Jul/Aug. 2006) entitled “Secret Genocide:” Otunnu spoke of 4,000 people sharing one latrine, women waiting for 12 hours to fill a jerrycan at a well, 10 people packing themselves sardine-like in a hut."
As a result, any form of economic activity has been brought to a grinding halt. A whole culture, and environment are being systematically destroyed by the Ugandan government's counter-insurgency policy. “Everything Acholi is dying,” wrote one commentator. Human development indicators reported that: 95% of population now lives below the poverty line — 70% living in absolute poverty; 1,000 children die in the region every week of preventable causes. Contrast that with the situation in the Southern and Western Uganda, where only 37% live below the poverty line.
This situation cannot continue without serious action being taken to reverse the fortunes of Northern Uganda and the Great Lakes Region for the better. The GOSS and vice president Dr. Machar have committed themselves to a demanding task. They are now under intense scrutiny to show leadership or lose their credibility. It still remains to be seen whether Dr. Machar will stay the course and not allow himself to be manipulated or unduly influenced by any of the conflicting parties.
Dr John Akec is a political analyst based in London . He is also the editor of a blog where he posts articles and comments about the Sudan. Akec can be reached at
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. Visit his blog at:
http://johnakecsouthsudan.blogspot.com/.
