Mahmood Mamdani | New Vision, Monday, July 10
No matter the outcome, the Juba talks will mark a historic turning point in the development of the conflict in Northern Uganda. Even at first glance, these talks differ from all previous contacts with the LRA on two counts:
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1) The talks will take place outside the country and,
2) They will involve a third party. That third party is the SPLA, now the Government of
South Sudan.
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The South Sudan invitation to the talks is also a declaration: the new government in Juba is signaling its determination to take an independent initiative, even if that initiative is unpopular in Kampala. The significance of this development cannot be lost on Ugandans.
Learning from Rwanda
SPLA is not the first armed movement to come to power with direct and critical assistance from the Government of Uganda. The first was the RPA in Rwanda. Ugandans need to recall the remarkably short period during which relations between RPA and NRA soured , turning yesterday's bosom buddies into today's warring neighbours. That bit of history is full of lessons that can guide us over the next five years.
Like the RPA, the SPLA too is making a transition from an oppositional movement to a government in power. Can Uganda learn from the unfortunate Rwandan episode that a stable and dignified relationship with a neighbouring state has to be based on equality and mutual recognition of vital interests?
To learn that lesson, however, we have to drop all wishful thinking, such as the idea mooted by many that the Juba initiative is coming from a faction in the South Sudan government, one that is said to be a proxy of the security cabal in Khartoum. The initiative may have been prompted by a faction, and may have support from several outside quarters. But none of this is the real point: the initiative is politically significant because it came from the South Sudan government, which is why it had to be taken seriously by the political leadership in Kampala.
That the SPLA should have given such high priority to sponsoring negotiations to end the on-again off-again shadow boxing between LRA and the Government of Uganda should be a matter of some consideration. After all, the SPLA knows the facts on the ground in northern Uganda at least as well as the government of Uganda. The initiative confirms its judgment that a negotiated end to the conflict is necessary for peace, not only in northern Uganda but also in South Sudan. If only for this reason, Kampala's approach to the negotiations is likely to be an important factor in shaping the future of relations between the two governments.
The impact on Uganda's internal politics
There is a second reason why the Juba talks are likely to prove a historic turning point. This has to do with the history of North-South relations in Uganda's politics. The emergence of an autonomous South Sudan marks an end to the two decade long politi cal quarantine imposed on northern Uganda by the Movement government. From now on, unless there is a marked change in how central power in Kampala relates to northern Uganda, and to other regions, Uganda's continued existence as a country cannot be taken for granted. The irony is that Kampala has hitherto proceeded as if only the territorial integrity of Sudan is at stake in the region at large. It must now understand that the territorial integrity of Uganda too will be in question over the next decade.
From the time the NRA came to power in 1986, educated Acholi (and, in general, educated Northerners) have faced an insolvable dilemma. Their only meaningful political choice has been between different forms of militarism: either to join one or another armed rebellion against the government or to support a government whose repression has rarely made a distinction between armed rebellions and local civilians. In this context, those opting for a parliamentary option have had little space to organize a civilian political base. That space shrank further as government began forcibly herding the Acholi rural population into barbed-wire camps a decade ago.
The irony is that even when they faced the LRA's brutal terror, few Acholi saw the government in Kampala as the source of protection. This single fact is testimony to the political failure of this government's northern policy. It also explains why the Northern population has united around the demand for peace, and not justice.
The simple fact is that civilians understand peace and justice as alternative code words: peace for an end to terror, and justice for its continuation. Thus the euphoria which greeted the announcement of the Juba talks, unlike the gloom that followed the entry of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the scene.
But the sad fact is that the government in Kampala is not in a position to reap a bonus from the peace euphoria, at least not yet. Public opin ion in the whole country (and not just the north) is savvy enough to realise that the Juba talks are an initiative of the new South Sudan government, and that Kampala's participation in it is at best reluctant.
The Juba talks are a good indication that the balance of power in Ugandan politics is shifting. With an SPLA government in Juba, an entirely new set of options has opened up for the political North - and therefore for other regional players - in Uganda. Already, there are numerous voices speculating about a possible Nile state, one that would emerge out of the union of South Sudan and northern Uganda. Ugandans need to beware that an autonomous South Sudan has opened up multiple futures, including independence for South Sudan and secession for northern Uganda. Whether or not these possibilities are translated into reality depends as much on the calibre of political leadership in Kampala and Khartoum, as in Juba and Gulu. Just as the new situation has led to unde rstanding and empathy between Juba and Gulu, it may yet herald a different relationship between Kampala and Khartoum.
This is why the Juba talks are likely to constitute the most serious political challenge for both Kony and Museveni. As more political options open up for the northern political class, Kony will run the risk of being eclipsed by another, more explicitly political movement, whether armed or not. The likelihood of this happening will increase should the Juba talks fail. In that case, Museveni will face the most serious political crisis of his fifth term, one rife with serious consequences for the political integrity of the country.
Kampala needs a new set of options
Kampala needs an option other than the ICC. Even when Kampala first invited the ICC to charge Kony and the political leadership of the LRA, the entire exercise smacked of short-sighted political opportunism.
The ICC was never set up as a substitute for national courts. The i dea was that national courts would continue to try nationals who commit atrocities in their own country. The ICC was meant to do what national courts could not, which is to hold accountable those who unleash terror outside their own countries. This is why the ICC is also a court of the last resort. Like all international courts and organisations, it depends on an international consensus to take any step. In the case of the LRA and northern Uganda at least, that consensus is fast eroding.
For Uganda to have called on the ICC to try its own nationals for crimes against humanity was tantamount to admitting both that the government lacked effective sovereignty over parts of its own country and that it had run out of viable political options. This voluntary admission that it was the government of a 'failed state' may yet come to haunt the Museveni government.
For those wanting to understand the folly of an ICC option and the potential of a negotiated strategy, the appropriate analogy is not the end of Nazi Germany but that of apartheid South Africa. If an international court had insisted on trying the perpetrators of apartheid in the name of justice in 1990, it would have only delayed the end of apartheid and the suffering of the South African people, who knows for how long. Let us remember that apartheid did not end with the involvement of an international court of justice, but with a negotiated political settlement at Kempton Park.
Just as the end of apartheid followed a change in the international balance of forces at the end of the Cold War and made possible a new political era based on reconciliation (and not justice), so the changed regional balance of forces offers us the possibility of a historic national reconciliation. But so long as Kampala's vision is confined to Kony and the LRA, and its agenda limited to revenge in the name of justice, a durable reconciliation is likely to evade us.
This is why it is time Kampal a acknowledges that the changing balance of forces in the region is likely to have a deep-seated impact on our internal politics. For the fact is that the SPLA initiative offers an opportunity to launch a much-needed comprehensive reform. For a start, I have three suggestions: a cloa closure of the camps alongside a step-by-step rehabilitation program for its occupants; a general political amnesty alongside a warm welcome home for exiled sons and daughters of the soil; and a broad-based national discussion followed by a government of national unity in which all political forces, northern and southern, will have a prominent voice.
The writer is the Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University
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