Friends For Peace In Africa

Dr. Okot Nyormoi | July 13, 2008

The Struggle for Who Will Write the Last Chapter of the Kony-Museveni War

Part I

The Juba peace talks started on July 14, 2006 was expected to end in a peacefully negotiated end of the 22 year old war between the Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). After a series of negotiated peace agreements, the process was supposed to have been crowned by the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement by Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA and President Museveni. However, after several attempts, Kony failed to show up at the scheduled time and place to sign the agreement. By now, it is clear that the Juba peace talks have stalled.

Many people are now wondering about what it means and what should be done about it. It is, therefore, urgent that the stakeholders in this war critically address these questions before new steps can be taken to move the peace process forward to avoid making the same mistakes.

To address this question, it will be helpful to summarize the critical stakeholders in this war. They include the following the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) regime, the LRA, Civil Society, Humanitarian Organizations, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and non-African Foreign Governments (Super power and secondary powers).

As always, there are many explanations ranging from a curse from God to sabotage. However, the most prominent of them has been the so-called peace spoilers. This explanation has been persistently used by various stakeholders, particularly against Acholis in the Diaspora. Some people have advised that we should not pay attention to it, but because the explanation persists, it is important that we should seriously try to understand it in order to put it in proper perspectives. To do so, we need to ask the following questions: 1) who among the critical stakeholders are making the accusation and 2) who are the so-called peace spoilers?

As far, it appears that the accusation is coming from many sides, but for different reasons. However, it can be said with confidence that most, if not all, the stakeholders agree that this war must come to an end. This is because the war has served its purposes and has reached a diminishing return. As such it has now become an embarrassment and a burden to most of the stakeholders. Therefore it must end.

Writing the Last Chapter of the War

While civil society, humanitarian organizations and donor counties may not care from a militaristic point of view, the LRA and the GOU are seriously contesting how the final chapter of the war should be written. The contention revolves around whether the end of the war will be recorded as a failure of President Museveni to defeat the rag tag LRA rebel outfit of mostly abducted child soldiers or whether Museveni won a military victory over the notorious LRA, read Acholi, Northern Ugandans and the Greater North? Likewise, should it be recorded that Kony surrendered to Museveni or Kony and Museveni fought to a draw? The question of who will write the last chapter of the war appears to be the most important explanation of why Kony so far has refused to sign the comprehensive agreement. It is for the same reason that Museveni wants to be the last one to sign the agreement.

This is critical for egotistical reasons. First, one of the goals of President Museveni was to destroy the myth or notion that militarism is a preserve of the people from northern and eastern Uganda. To do so, he sought to demystify the gun, meaning everyone, particularly from the south, should be taught how to fire a gun. Although he successfully demystify the gun, he has not been able to accomplish the ultimate goal of crushing any remnants of organized violence in the north and east that has so far survived in the form of the LRA. Therefore, the LRA as a symbol of the alleged northern and eastern military superiority is still to be destroyed.

While publicly Museveni pays lip service to a negotiated settlement, he keeps acting as though a negotiated peace settlement will deprive him of a military triumph. Additionally, a negotiated peace settlement will allow the LRA to claim that the people of the north and east were never defeated militarily, thus giving more mileage to the notion of northern military superiority.

To counterbalance such a perceived military failure, Museveni and his propaganda agents have been insisting that they have defeated the LRA. Recently, Museveni also evoked a concocted history, claiming that his ethnic group, the Bahima were the ones who defeated Nilotics, thus stopping them from advancing south into Ankole and beyond.

The ICC is an Abused Legal Tool

Just for the record, the idea of the ICC itself for prosecuting people who commit crimes against humanity is wonderful. However, the problem with the ICC is with its implementation, particularly in the case of Uganda. First, the chief prosecutor, Ocampo, announced the indictment of the LRA at a press conference with President Museveni when President Museveni himself is a party to the conflict. Since then, it was reported that bribery might have been involved in securing the ICC indictment of the LRA commanders. It is in the context of how the last chapter of the war should be written that the LRA does not appear to want to submit its commanders to the ICC.

It is apparent that the LRA simply regards the ICC as just another clever tool Museveni is using against it. It is even more so when the ICC does not want to try UPDF commanders who are known to have committed equally gross crimes against humanity. It is well known that it was UPDF excesses that gave rise to the various rebel groups such as Uganda Peoples Defense Army (UPDA), Uganda Peoples Army (UPA), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRFII), Lakwena Holy Spirit, LRA and others. It is in this sense that the ICC as it is being used has lost its values or credibility in the eyes of many people, particularly the victims of the crimes.

Read Part II